Michael Lurz-Hempelmann: Parlamentsorganisation im Angesicht des Populismus, Gebunden

Klappentext

In light of the growing influence of populist parties in Germany and France, Michael Lurz-Hempelmann takes up the political debate surrounding the strategy of the "firewall" ( cordon sanitaire ) and, through a comparative analysis of the two countries' legal systems, examines the central question of to what extent parliamentary groups may be excluded from individual parliamentary bodies under parliamentary law.

His study argues that, despite differing degrees of the constitutionalisation and juridification of politics, it is primarily the majority principle in both countries that enables parliamentary groups to limit the influence of populist minorities within parliamentary bodies. In Germany, constitutional law serves as a crucial instrument for resolving disputes and establishing minimum standards that minorities and opposition groups may invoke before constitutional courts in individual cases. France, by contrast, offers no equivalent judicial avenue. There, decisions taken by the parliamentary majority must prove their legitimacy in the political arena and are judged according to whether they preserve the institutional balance of the parliamentary system.

These divergent approaches do not necessarily result in different legal standards governing the composition of parliamentary bodies. On the contrary, the comparative analysis reveals strikingly similar legal assessments regarding the extent to which minorities must be represented in different types of parliamentary bodies. How majorities make use of the discretion afforded to them ultimately depends on historical and cultural traditions that are difficult to capture in legal categories, yet should always be taken into account when seeking a functional parliamentary organisation.